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bail it out simply because other banks are exposed to it (that is, a policy of "Too Big to Fail"). Rather, direct assistance should be provided to the exposed banks to the extent determined by the optimal mechanism. Second, the optimal mechanism may sometimes require that a solvent bank with exposure to other illiquid banks be closed down. This is a way to ensure that it has the ex ante incentive to monitor. But to the extent that the central bank cannot commit to let/force such banks to close down, it may be optimal to have no interbank risk exposure whatsoever. Finally, monitoring spillovers between banks may lead to situations where closures are optimally intertwined. Essentially, the idea is that the rents a bank gets from its business operations may also give it the incentive to monitor other banks, and in turn, improve their operations. A shock to the bank's business operations not only gives it a lower incentive to run its business well, but also reduces its incentive to monitor other banks. This can reduce the performance of neighboring banks also, making it optimal, under extreme circumstances, for the entire system to close down.
As could be expected from two of the foremost economic theorists, this is indeed a thought-provoking paper. I will focus my comments on what I think fruitful extensions of this work could be. That so many issues can be explored in the context of the model speaks to the richness of the model and the value of the theoretical exercise the authors have undertaken.
Banks undertake many kinds of transactions with each other, of which intra-day payments are only one. Others include interbank overnight loans in the Fed funds market and transactions in the over-the-counter market. These transactions differ tremendously in their frequency and the degree to which counterparties have the opportunity to monitor each other. For instance, the frequency of payment transactions is very high, as also is the likelihood that counterparties are relatively unrelated. In such a market, it may make sense to guarantee the transactions against credit risk simply to avoid repeated wasteful monitoring. By contrast, lenderborrower relationships may be much more stable in the overnight federal funds market. The issues the authors address may be more pertinent here. Also, it would be interesting to explore whether further segmentation of risk exposure, even within this market, is possible. For instance, one could think of forming subgroups of banks who interact frequently with each other. Interbank exposures within subgroups would not be guaranteed, while exposures between subgroups would be guaranteed. Whether such an arrangement (reminiscent of clearinghouses) leads to arbitrage possibilities or moral hazard is an issue worth exploring.
The discussion of "Too Big to Fail" is also intriguing. The authors raise the possibility that the failure of a bank could lead to reduced values in the banks it monitors. But another reason why authorities may adhere to a policy of "Too Big to Fail" is that the extent and location of the liabilities of a large bank are rarely publicly known. The potential failure of a large bank then creates uncertainty about which banks have exposure to it. This uncertainty slows transacting in all credit sensitive markets and creates substantial economic loss. It is important that regulators resolve uncertainty quickly. But as the authors point out, it may be more efficient for the central bank to guarantee payment to the exposed banks rather than bail out the dis- 
